THE SUFFOLK RESOLVES:  A NEGLECTED CATALYST OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION by Knox, Duncan M.
THE SUFFOLK RESOLVES: 
A NEGLECTED CATALYST OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
An Honors Thesis 
Presented to the Honors Program of 
Angelo State University 
In Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for Highest University Honors 
BACHELOR OF ARTS 
by 
DUNCAN McCAIN KNOX 
May 2015 
Major: History 
THE SUFFOLK RESOLVES: 
A NEGLECTED CATALYST OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
by 
DUNCAN McCAIN KNOX 
APPROVED: 
 Dr. Shirley M. Eoff, Chair 
 Professor of History 
 Dr. David P. Dewar 
 Associate Professor of History 
 Dr. Christine M. Lamberson  
 Assistant Professor of History 
 May 12, 2015 
 Date Successfully Defended and 
 Approved by Advisory Committee 
APPROVED: 
Dr. Shirley M. Eoff      May 15, 2015 
Director of the Honors Program
iii 
To My Father 
Bobby Knox 
For instilling in me a lifelong love of learning 
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
This thesis could not have been completed without the support and guidance from a 
multitude of people. I would like to thank my friends and family for their love and 
encouragement throughout this entire process. I would also like to acknowledge the staffs of the
West Texas Collection and the Honors Program. Your polite nudges and reassurances 
throughout this journey proved invaluable. I could not have finished such a daunting task 
without you all. This is especially true of my peers and companions in the Honors Program 
who wrote a thesis this past year alongside me and shared in this roller coaster of an 
experience. 
I must extend my gratitude to the members of my thesis committee. First, Dr. David 
Dewar who has been a constant source of encouragement throughout my undergraduate 
career and in whose Colonial America class I first began researching this topic. He served as 
my ballast in the history department, not only in academic ventures but in other endeavors as 
well. Second, Dr. Christine Lamberson who agreed to serve on my thesis committee while 
having me in class for the first time. She offered insightful comments on my thesis and much 
needed advice on graduate school. Her passion for history is apparent in all she does. I hope 
to continue to work with both of these historians in the future.  Finally, I must extend my 
deepest thanks to Dr. Shirley Eoff, Director of the Honors Program and my thesis advisor, for 
all of her hard work and encouragement. Over the past four years, my growth as an historian, 
honors student, and human being was impacted most by her mentorship. Her unwavering 
dedication to students, coupled with her skill as an historian and editor, is inspiring. I count 
v 
myself lucky to have been one of her students and hope to pass on the lessons she taught me, 
both in and out of the classroom, to my future pupils. 
vi 
ABSTRACT 
Before Lexington and Concord, glimmers of revolutionary thoughts and ideas existed 
in the American colonies; however, a document known as the Suffolk Resolves, written in 
mid-1774, crystallized these divergent ideas into a more consistent response to troubling 
British policies. The Suffolk Resolves signaled to the First Continental Congress that 
segments of the American populace, while still loyal to George III, were willing to raise a 
militia to protect their rights from Parliamentary actions that they deemed harmful to 
American interests. The Continental Congress’ endorsement of these resolutions shifted the 
momentum in favor of more radical elements and hardened positions in both Britain and the 
colonies. This thesis analyzes the Suffolk Resolves and their place in the historiography of 
the American Revolution. It considers the political tension underlying the writing and 
passage of the Resolves as well as the reaction to the document in both America and Britain. 
The thesis highlights the significance of the Suffolk Resolves as a transitional catalyst 
leading to the American Revolution. 
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On September 11, 1774, Paul Revere set off on horseback from Milton, 
Massachusetts, carrying a series of resolutions from the Suffolk County Convention in his 
saddlebags. Over an impressively quick, yet exhausting, five day period, Revere traveled 
over 350 miles of rough, winding roads with an express mission to deliver the Suffolk 
Resolves to the First Continental Congress meeting at Carpenter’s Hall in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania.1 The First Continental Congress delegates anxiously awaited news from 
Boston where the Cambridge Powder Alarm had led to reports (later proved false) of 
bloodshed and destruction of the city. Revere’s arrival brought news of the true situation in 
Boston, but did little to relieve the tense atmosphere. The Resolves he brought initiated bitter 
debate and “galvanized the First Continental Congress into taking a stand” on Boston’s 
plight.2 John Adams wrote in a diary entry on September 17, 1774, remarking on the 
adoption of these resolutions by the First Continental Congress: “This was one of the 
happiest Days of my Life. In Congress we had generous, noble Sentiments, and manly 
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perish with her.”3 The Philadelphia delegates’ endorsement of the Resolves pushed them “to 
decide what stand to take” on the broader Anglo-American relationship.4 
The Stamp Act, Boston Tea Party, First Continental Congress, and the Declaration of 
Rights and Grievances are all familiar components in the story leading up to the American 
Revolution. While seemingly peripheral today, lost in both the passage of time and the 
writing of history, the Suffolk Resolves constitute a document that would have resonated just 
as deeply with the people of their time as any of the aforementioned occurrences. The 
Resolves served as a transitional catalyst in the movement towards revolution. It was the 
Suffolk Resolves that took divergent elements of resistance to British actions and crystalized 
them into a consistent and coherent response to troubling British policies. They provided the 
first sign that resistance in Colonial America was rooted more deeply than previously 
perceived, as demonstrated when the other colonies threw their support behind Boston. They 
contained the first implied threat to take up arms against Great Britain if colonial demands 
were not met. The Resolves forced the First Continental Congress to take a stand (though 
primarily verbal support) on the immediate crisis involving Boston. The endorsement of the 
Resolves sparked intense debate over a proper response to the broader disputes with Great 
Britain and shifted the tone of the Continental Congress to a slightly more radical one. The 
Suffolk Resolves proved pivotal to British thinking, convincing officials that they could not 
back down and that legislative activity would not bring the rebellious colonists under control. 
3 John Adams, Diary, September 17, 1774, quoted in Edmund C. Burnett, ed. Letters 
of Members of the Continental Congress. Vol.1 (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution of 
Washington, 1921), 34. Adobe PDF eBook. 
4 Labaree, 272. 
2 
Despite their significance at the time, the Resolves have been subsumed in historical 
writings for a variety of reasons. The First Continental Congress sent the Resolves to 
Parliament along with their own Declaration of Rights and Grievances, a more moderate 
document that addressed similar issues as the Resolves, but without the fiery tone or 
suggestion of armed resistance. Moreover, a collective body representing twelve colonies 
developed the Declaration of Rights and Grievances, legitimizing that document as reflecting 
shared grievances across multiple colonies. The Suffolk Resolves, though endorsed by the 
First Continental Congress, could be dismissed as representing the dissatisfaction of a single 
colony. Furthermore, historical accounts of the Revolutionary Era consistently moved 
towards a national narrative, emphasizing a unified march towards freedom and democracy 
and the role of early national leaders. Local developments, like the Suffolk Resolves, faded 
into the background. 
This work seeks to highlight one pivotal moment within the broader scope of 
American Revolutionary history. Restoring the Suffolk Resolves to the position they once 
held serves to expand our knowledge rather than diminish the significance of more well- 
known events. This study analyzes the Suffolk Resolves and explores the public climate 
surrounding the document’s creation, their reception by contemporaries and the overall 




THE SUFFOLK RESOLVES IN AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
HISTORIOGRAPHY 
Historians of the American Revolution often either ignore the Suffolk Resolves 
entirely or cover them somewhat superficially. This occurs both in terms of the substance of 
the pre-revolutionary document and in the presentation of its significance in the broader 
development of revolutionary discourse. Often historians limit any mention of the Suffolk 
Resolves to either a small cluster of sentences or a generic footnote, basically noting its 
delivery to the First Continental Congress by Paul Revere and its passage by that body. Some 
works include the text or excerpts from the document or a brief overview of key point before 
moving on to the more familiar revolutionary documents and battlefield activity. An analysis 
of the treatment of the Resolves from the early works of contemporary chroniclers to more 
recent writings by revolutionary scholars reveals significant differences in terms of their 
perception of its radicalism and its significance to the broader revolutionary discourse and 
independence movement. The analysis also reveals that American and British historians 
often view the Revolutionary era in general, and the Suffolk Resolves in particular, in very 
different terms. 
Early commentators, both American and British, directly following the American 
Revolution generally mentioned the Suffolk Resolves and seemed to recognize them as 
significant in shaping the direction of colonial resistance. David Ramsay in The History of 
the American Revolution (1789) referenced the “spirited resolutions” and noted the 
4  
uncertainty of how they would be received. Ramsay characterized the Suffolk Resolves as 
contributing greatly to the solidification of a unified colonial resistance and the movement 
towards war. Ramsay also commented on the frustration the British government felt 
following the endorsement of the Resolves by the First Continental Congress.1 Mercy Otis 
Warren, in History of the Rise, Progress and Termination of the American Revolution (1805), 
saw the boldness and determination of the delegates as representative of the spirit of 
Americans. She noted that the Suffolk Resolves “were considered by [the British] 
government to be the most overt acts of treason that had yet taken place” and that the actions 
of the Suffolk Convention captured the “spirit of Americans at that time.”2 
The portrayal of the Suffolk Resolves by early British historians varied significantly 
depending upon their overall view of the merit of the American Revolution and their attitude 
toward the British political system.3 American events often take a backseat to broader 
concerns about the state of the British imperial system in British historiography. To British 
historians, the American colonies were “passive objects on the periphery,” considered only at 
times of crisis and primarily in relation to understanding the actions of Kings and 




1 David Ramsay, The History of the American Revolution, ed. Lester H. Cohen (1789; 
repr., Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1990), 119, 147. 
 
2 Mercy Otis Warren, History of the Rise, Progress and Termination of the American 
Revolution (1805; repr., New York: AMS Press, Inc., 1970), 160-161. 
 
3 For an overview of late 18th and 19th century British approaches to the American 
Revolution as a whole, see Richard Middleton, “British Historians and the American 
Revolution,” Journal of American Studies 5, no. 1 (April 1971): 43-58. 
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as in how it reflected and altered politics in Great Britain. Additionally, British historians 
generally see the resistance as developing only in 1775 so earlier precursors like the Suffolk 
Resolves tend to receive minimal coverage. 
Beginning with John Andrews’ four-volume account of the war published in 1785, 
British historians wrote about the American Revolution largely in terms of “resigned 
bitterness” at the supposed passing of their empire. They did little more than narrate events 
and often lacked familiarity with the American colonies or access to American source 
materials. Andrews saw the Revolution as a whole as “a senseless act of political 
desecration.”5 Even those Whig historians supportive of the American cause like William 
Gordon, one of few early British writers to use American sources, provided little more than a 
simple narrative of events. Gordon’s The History of the Rise, Progress and Establishment of 
the Independence of the United States of America (originally published in London in 1788) 
included a reference to the “spirited preamble” of the Suffolk Resolves, excerpted a 
significant portion of the grievances, and quoted the Continental Congress’ response. He 
spoke of the Suffolk citizens anxiously awaiting news and acknowledged that they saw 
approval as a sign to move forward with arming and training a militia.6 Gordon’s concern 
was less on the actual events in the colonies than on using colonial tensions to comment on 




5 Ibid., 43. 
 
6 William Gordon, The History of the Rise, Progress and Establishment of the 
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257. Adobe PDF eBook. 
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little direct commentary on the Suffolk Resolves, their inclusion suggests that he considered 
them significant and recognized that the Continental Congress’ response set the tone for the 
next stage of Anglo-American affairs. 
Most of the early British accounts, however, exhibited a Tory bias and considered the 
events of the American Revolution in general, and the Suffolk Resolves in particular, in a 
more negative light. Less critical of the British government than Whig historians, they placed 
the responsibility for the troubles in the American colonies on the ungrateful colonies. John 
Adolphus, in The History of England (originally published in 1802) summarized the content 
of the Resolves and asserted that their adoption by the First Continental Congress illustrated 
the underlying shift from competing colonial interests to a sense of common cause.7 He 
stated that the Suffolk Convention “passed resolutions more decidedly hostile to the authority 
of Great Britain than any which had yet been explicitly sanctioned.” Further, he saw the 
resolutions as calculated to inspire resistance and frame obedience to Parliament as a 
“dereliction of natural right.” 8 
Mid-19th century American historians, best exemplified by George Bancroft, reflected 
 
a new nationalist approach to the writing of American history. Bancroft’s History of the 
United States: From the Discovery of the American Continent, written in 1858, continued to 
approach the Suffolk Resolves from a similar vantage point as Warren and Ramsay, but 
downplayed its significance as a catalyst. The Suffolk Resolves seemed to be considered less 
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as a radical statement of their own and more a minor component of the larger collective 
actions of the First Continental Congress. Their endorsement was seen as less significant in 
its own right and more as an example of the wisdom and reported unanimity of the First 
Continental Congress.9
Following Bancroft’s seminal classic, American historians of the late 19th and early 
20th centuries continued this generic approach in regard to addressing the issue of the Suffolk 
Resolves. John Fiske, in The American Revolution (1891), provided a brief overview of the 
document and its development, but failed to consider its broader significance in the 
movement towards revolution.10 British historians of the mid-nineteenth century returned to a 
more Whiggish interpretation. While Tory historians had blamed ungrateful colonists for the 
revolution, notable mid-nineteenth century British historians such as John Richard Green and 
Sir George Otto Trevelyan placed responsibility squarely in the hands of King George III and 
his ministers, thus specific local events received little or no mention in their works.11 British 
historians of the early twentieth century, led by Sir Lewis Namier, remained focused on 
analyzing the structure of British politics during the reign of George III. The American 
Revolution as a whole received little mention.12 It was often seen as an anomaly or an 
aberration, and the focus shifted to the inability of the North administration to provide 
9 George Bancroft, History of the United States, From the Discovery of the American 
Continent (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1858), 134. 
10 John Fiske, The American Revolution (Boston: The University Press Cambridge, 
1891), 108-112. 
11 Middleton, "British Historians and the American Revolution", 49-50. 
12 Middleton, "British Historians and the American Revolution", 54, 57. 
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alternative policies to control the developing situation in America. The political atmosphere 
of the time left the British government no choice but to clamp down on the colonies, an 
understandable but fatal decision. With this focus, colonial unrest remains in the background, 
and specific incidents in a single county do not merit mention. 
American historiography from the imperial school dominated from the 1930s to the 
1950s. Lawrence Henry Gipson’s The Triumphant Empire: Britain Sails into the Storm 1770- 
1776, though written in 1967, reflects his training in the imperial school of thought. He 
included a summary of the Suffolk Resolves, noting that following the approval of the 
Resolves by the First Continental Congress the mood of the delegates shifted to “not one of 
compromise.”13 More importantly, Gipson’s work stands as one of the earliest 
characterizations of the Suffolk Resolves as being “revolutionary in nature…judged by their 
similarity to the later Declaration of Independence.”14 In that same vein, constitutional 
historians Alfred Kelly and Winifred Harbison’s The American Constitution: Its Origins and 
Development (1970) stressed the Suffolk delegates’ strategic decision to try to push the 
Continental Congress toward a more radical position and saw its passage as evidence of 
radicals gaining the upper hand.15 British historians writing at the same time continued to 
downplay incidents like the Suffolk Resolves. Bernard Donoughue’s British Politics and the 
13 Lawrence Henry Gipson, The Triumphant Empire: Britain Sails Into the Storm 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967), 251. 
14 Ibid., 158, 245. 
15 Alfred Kelly and Winifred Harbison, The American Constitution: Its Origins and 
Development, 4th ed. (New York: WW Norton, 1970), 84. 
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American Revolution (1964) included the Suffolk Resolves, but referenced them only as 
resolutions sent with the Declaration of Rights in early 1775 to Britain.16
Beginning with the progressive school of American historians, attention returned to 
the roots of the original rebellion. Merrill Jensen’s The Founding of a Nation: A History of 
the American Revolution (1968) described the text of the Resolves as “inflammatory” and 
counted their passage by the First Continental Congress as a huge strategic victory for 
popular leaders that committed Congress to the program outlined within the document.17 
Additionally, the approval of the Suffolk Resolves, Jensen argued, committed Congress to 
the idea of the “law of nature” as a guiding principle in the future political discourse and 
proved “crucial in the affairs of the Continental Congress.”18 David Ammerman, in the 1974 
monograph In the Common Cause: American Response to the Coercive Acts of 1774, 
described the Suffolk Resolves as “supposedly radical” and saw Congress’ endorsement of 
the document as the “first indication of the temperament of the delegates.”19
Authors influenced by the rise of the new social history movement have committed to 
restoring the common people to the grand narrative of history, thus focusing more attention 
on developments at the local level and among less well-known figures. The 1976 monograph 
16 Bernard Donoughue, British Politics and the American Revolution: The Path to 
War, 1773-75 (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1964), 219. 
17 Merrill Jensen, The Founding of a Nation: A History of the American Revolution 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 496. 
18 Ibid., 503, 551. 
19 David Ammerman, In the Common Cause: American Response to the Coercive 
Acts of 1774 (Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1974), 74-75. 
10 
Empire or Independence, 1760-1776: A British-American Dialogue on the Coming of the 
Revolution, co-written by British historian Ian R. Christie and American historian Benjamin 
W. Labaree, argued that the Suffolk Resolves served as a “major factor” leading the First 
Continental Congress towards a more radical position. Christie and Labaree contended that 
the Resolves “outlined a strong programme of defiance for the inhabitants of that county to 
pursue, including a posture of civil disobedience in respect to the royal government under 
General Thomas Gage.”20 Page Smith, in A New Age Now Begins (1976), added the unique 
suggestion that the Suffolk recommendation for purging the militia of those whose patriotism 
might be suspect served as the seeds of the later Minutemen.21 
Jack Rakove’s 1979 work The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive 
History of the Continental Congress contended that the Suffolk Resolves served as the “first 
serious test of congressional sentiment.” Rakove argued that the Resolves were not “as 
belligerent or provocative as they have often been portrayed,” but were “designed to express 
a forthright commitment to a program of resistance.” The goal, in Rakove’s opinion, was to 
“enable defiance without alienating support of the other colonies,” while carrying out “a 
strategy of civil disobedience, but not passive resistance.” Supporters of the Resolves aimed 
to disrupt the authority of new administrators in Britain, while avoiding armed confrontation. 





20 Ian R. Christie and Benjamin W. Labaree, Empire or Independence, 1760-1776: A 
British-American Dialogue on the Coming of the American Revolution (Oxford: Phaidon 
Press Limited, 1976), 208-209. 
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Continental Congress to accept a “moderate alternative to other imaginable measures.”22 
Rakove’s later Pulitzer Prize winning book, Revolutionaries: A New History of the Invention 
of America (2010), returned to a focus on the great political figures of the era. As a result, the 
Suffolk Resolves received mention only in terms of how they impacted the political careers 
of John and Samuel Adams, not their effect on the greater political discourse of the era.23 
British historian Colin Bonwick, in The American Revolution (1991), echoed some of 
Rakove’s earlier sentiments in regard to the purpose of the passage of the Suffolk Resolves. 
Although, “inflammatory” in nature, Bonwick asserted that the First Continental Congress’ 
primary goal “was to bring Massachusetts under collective continental control rather than 
incite it to fresh action.”24 
American historian T.H. Breen’s American Insurgents, American Patriots: The 
Revolution of the People (2010) gives the fullest account of the Suffolk Resolves available to 
date. Breen’s focus on restoring the common people as agents of their own history led him to 
acknowledge the Suffolk Resolves as a “largely forgotten document.” He saw the Suffolk 
Resolves as expressing a “shrill call for resistance to British authority” at the local level and 
influencing the actions of the so-called leaders. Breen argued that the Resolves resulted from 




22 Jack Rakove, The Beginnings of National Politics: An Interpretive History of the 
Continental Congress (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1979), 46-48. 
 
23 Jack Rakove, Revolutionaries: A New History of the Invention of America (New 
York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2010), 57. 
 
24 Colin Bonwick, The American Revolution (Charlottesville: University Press of 
Virginia, 1991), 81. 
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uncompromising opposition to the Coercive Acts.” 25 A contemporary of Breen, Ray Raphael 
in Founders: The People Who Brought You a Nation (2009), recognized the significance of 
the Resolves in shifting the tone of the First Continental Congress. He saw them as pushing 
conservative delegates like Galloway “into supporting them as to do otherwise was to risk 
being branded a traitor to the cause.”26 
Beyond the broader histories of the American Revolution, biographers of major 
players such as Paul Revere, Thomas Hutchinson, General Thomas Gage, and Joseph Warren 
attached great significance to the Suffolk Resolves. Esther Forbes, in the 1942 biography 
Paul Revere and the World He Lived In, argued that the Suffolk Resolves expressed an “out 
and out statement of potential revolution” and “proved to be a springboard from which it was 
easy to plunge into the bloody whirlpool of civil wars.”27   David Fischer’s 1994 work Paul 
Revere’s Ride described Revere’s journey to Philadelphia carrying the Suffolk Resolves as 
“urgent” and referred to the Resolves themselves as “a decisive step in the road to 
revolution.”28 Bernard Bailyn in the 1974 biography The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson 
characterized the Suffolk Resolves as “ultimate and irreversible defiance.” He described the 





25 T. H. Breen, American Insurgents, American Patriots: The Revolution of the 




27 Esther Forbes, Paul Revere and the World He Lived In (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 
1942), 226-227. 
 
28 Fischer, 26-27. 
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containing a “fervent, inflammatory preamble.”29 Bailyn contended that the Resolves made it 
no longer possible to find a balance between American claims and English authority.30 John 
Richard Alden’s General Gage in America: Being Principally a History of His Role in the 
American Revolution (1948) stated that the “famous Suffolk County Convention… boldly 
declared that force should, if necessary, be used to prevent the enslavement of Americans and 
even hinted that the patriots would take the aggressive if it were required for their own 
safety.”31 Samuel Forman’s Dr. Joseph Warren: The Boston Tea Party, Bunker Hill, and the 
Birth of American Liberty (2012) focused on Joseph Warren’s direct input into the 
development of the document and argues that the “resolves presented a crisp agenda for the 
newly convened Continental Congress.” 32 John Cary’s Joseph Warren: Physician, Politician, 
Patriot (1961) presented the Suffolk Resolves as “one of the most important acts in 1774.” 
Cary contended that the Resolves forced the Continental Congress to “decide between 
humble petitions and quiet submission or disobedience and a defensive war.” 33 
Although the Suffolk Resolves received little attention in national histories, they 
assumed a central place in local histories beginning with Teele’s History of Milton, Mass. 
 
 
29 Bernard Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchinson (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press, 1974), 303. 
 
30 Ibid., 305. 
 
31 John Richard Alden, General Gage in America: Being Principally a History of His 
Role in the American Revolution (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1948), 
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32 Samuel A. Forman, Dr. Joseph Warren: The Boston Tea Party, Bunker Hill, and 
the Birth of American Liberty (Gretna: Pelican Publishing Company, 2012), 217. 
 
33 John Cary, Joseph Warren: Physician, Politician, Patriot (Urbana: University of 
Illinois Press, 1961), 158. 
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from 1640-1887 (1887) and continuing with Lauriston L. Scaife’s Milton and the Suffolk 
Resolves (1921) and later the Bicentennial pamphlet The Story of the Suffolk Resolves 
(1973).34 Each of these works recounted the events surrounding the passage of the Suffolk 
Resolves, both on the County and Congressional levels, and reprinted the text. However, the 
focus in each tended to be on a narrative retelling of the events and blanket assertions of their 
significance with little analysis or documentary evidence to support the claims. For instance, 
Webster and Morris, in The Story of the Suffolk Resolves, simply claimed that the Resolves 
“produced a great effect in this country and in England” but provide no examples or proof of 
that effect, except for appending a few generic excerpts from press reports.35 
Historians from colonial times to the present have certainly recorded a very basic 
narrative of the crafting and passage of the Suffolk Resolves; however, this important 
document deserves fuller coverage, particularly in regard to its reception at home and 
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Celebration Committee, 1973). 
 




ROAD TO THE RESOLVES 
 
 
The Suffolk Resolves emerged out of an atmosphere of tension and resentment 
between developing colonies and an overextended imperial system following Britain’s 
triumph in the Seven Year’s War. This tension came to a head with the passage of the 
infamous Coercive Acts.1 Prior to the passage of these acts in 1774, most Americans believed 
that their status as British subjects served them well and appreciated the sense of autonomy 
that distance from the mother country afforded them. They had grown accustomed to 
asserting their rights and getting redress through previous incidents like the Stamp Act Crisis. 
Thus, when a new dispute over the Tea Act erupted in 1773 few would have expected the 
crisis that ensued. This time, a small group of colonials in Boston asserted their rights by 
dumping a shipload of East India Company tea into the Boston Harbor. The so-called Boston 
Tea Party, which occurred on December 16, 1773, provoked a harsh response from the 
British government that took many by surprise. Americans seem to have been unaware that 
the British government had changed considerably since the Stamp Act of 1765. The men now 
in power in Great Britain rejected previous ministries’ permissive attitudes and conciliatory 
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Parliamentary authority. In their mind, the Tea Party offered a chance to restore order and 
reassert their control.2 
Political turmoil came to a boiling point throughout the six months following the Tea 
Party on both colonial and British fronts. Numerous Boston politicians continued to attempt 
to diplomatically resolve economic and social tensions, while public protests and acts of 
aggression continued in Boston.3 In Boston, the Tea Party cemented the relationship between 
two men, Boston physician Joseph Warren and Samuel Adams, whose political partnership 
would play a significant role in the developing resistance in Boston and the passage of the 
Suffolk Resolves. Following the Tea Party, Warren and Adams sparked British suspicions 
due to their involvement with the planning and execution of this act of protest. Sufficient 
evidence existed to convict the two of treason, but Massachusetts Governor Thomas Gage 
and the British government elected to focus on retribution for the entirety of Massachusetts, 
not just the so-called conspirators in the city of Boston.4 
Adams had begun visiting Warren in 1768 shortly before British troops landed in 
Boston. Over the course of the next six years, the political pairing blossomed into a personal 
friendship based on shared political ideologies. The two men spearheaded an unofficial 
communication network, with leaders across the colonies, that helped publicize their political 
positions as well as garner support for their cause in anticipation of Britain’s response to the 




2 Ammerman, 13-14. 
 
3 Cary, 135. 
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Britain and France, in January 1774, Samuel Adams discussed Bostonians’ resistance to the 
British plan to collect revenue through taxation of tea and asserted that the people of Boston 
should not be punished because the destruction of the tea resulted from British denial of 
legitimate colonial requests.5 Likewise, Warren’s correspondence with Lee reiterated the 
need for a shift in British-American relations.6 Warren, Adams, and others worked diligently 
to remove the Massachusetts Bay Colony Governor, Thomas Hutchinson. Such efforts 
succeeded as the Ministry in England recalled Hutchinson for “consultation,” but he never 
returned to Boston in his former position.7 
As tensions in Massachusetts simmered, Thomas Gage traveled to Boston to begin his 
tenure as the next governor general, replacing Hutchinson. Governor Gage arrived in May 
1774 with the Boston Port Bill, which effectively closed the Boston port on June 1, 1774. 
The Port Bill, a direct response to the Boston Tea Party, included the British demand that the 
East India Company be repaid for damages caused by the event. This act constituted one 
quarter of the Coercive (Intolerable) Acts. The government ordered the port closed without a 
British request for a colonial response, indicating that colonial protests had the unintended 
result of strengthening Britain’s resolve. Parliament chose to assert their authority.8 The 
closure of the port significantly restricted economic activity and the task of remedying the 
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economic fallout fell to the Committees of Correspondence. In Boston, Joseph Warren took 
the lead in framing the colonial response. He met with the Boston Committee of 
Correspondence on May 12, 1774, penning a letter that declared that the Port Act violated the 
rights of Bostonians and even arguing that it ran counter to international law. Warren wrote a 
second letter during this meeting to inform the rest of the colonies of the events in Boston  
and to ask for their support. In order to secure the safe passage of this news, the Committee 
of Correspondence selected Paul Revere to deliver this information due to the trust Warren 
and other members of the committee placed in Revere, as well as their distrust of the royal 
mail system.9 Parliament passed the remainder of the Coercive Acts throughout mid-1774. At 
the same time, the British government significantly increased the number of British troops in 
Boston. They expected the increased troop strength to help establish Gage’s authority and 
comfort pro-British colonists. Ironically, the increased British military presence in the 
summer of 1774 escalated the sense of tension throughout Boston and the greater colonies as 
a whole.10 
As Boston struggled under the demands of the Coercive Acts, surrounding colonies 
responded with offers of assistance. Committees of Correspondence throughout the colonies 
considered the plight of Boston and its implications for their own futures. Calls for an 
intercolonial Congress occurred against the backdrop of scattered acts of resistance and 
attacks on royal officials. Colonial leaders sought both to justify their resistance and to define 
their status within the broader British Empire. In Boston, where the Coercive Acts had the 
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most immediate impact, the focus turned to the economic crisis first. Warren and others 
worked to solidify the economic alliances that appeared through assistance from the other 
colonies. Warren penned the Solemn League and Covenant, requiring all signees to boycott 
English goods until Parliament repealed the Port Bill.11 This created a “means of 
enforcement...outside of normal governmental channels” in regard to British boycotts. The 
Solemn League failed as the colonies were not yet prepared to support such an aggressive 
form of resistance to British economic constraints. However, the principles expressed in the 
Solemn League and Covenant later became important components of the framework of 
American resistance and served as the foundation of the Continental Association, proposed 
by Warren in June 1774 and adopted by the Continental Congress soon after.12 The pressures 
to supplement the economic boycotts fed the calls for an intercolonial congress as general 
agreement existed that a boycott would not work unless applied uniformly by all colonies. 
Despite significant opposition in key colonies, all except Georgia appointed delegates and set 
September 1, 1774, as the start date.13 
Meanwhile, a Boston town meeting in July 1774 placed Warren and other patriot 
leaders on a committee to write a response to the new British acts, mirroring the actions of 
other counties in Massachusetts. Warren’s growing influence stemmed from his role in the 
developing Boston resistance as well as the appointment of better known figures like the 
Adams cousins to represent the colony in the Continental Congress. Fearful of the growing 
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influence of radical elements, Governor Gage placed a ban on town meetings.14 Warren and 
other Massachusetts leaders circumvented Gage’s ban by calling county conventions 
throughout the colony, an action that the British would not have anticipated as county 
conventions are foreign to the British political structure. Seven counties held conventions 
throughout the months of August and September, but most adopted a watchful waiting 
approach as they cautiously anticipated the deliberations of the approaching Continental 
Congress.15 The first of these county meetings took place in Berkshire County on July 6, 
1774, and the last major county convention took place in Bristol County on September 28 
and 29, 1774.16 Men gathered from all the towns in each county for their respective 
conventions. Indications that the Suffolk delegates knew of the activities of neighboring 
conventions exists within the formal resolves as they specifically noted their support for the 
county of Essex’s call for a Provisional Congress.17 Every county worked to develop an 
official response to the latest acts of Parliament. Although each convention adopted separate 
resolutions, many commonalities existed between the independent conventions’ final results, 
particularly with regard to trade restrictions, opposition to standing armies, and concerns 
about the judicial system. However, the Suffolk Resolves offered one of the most detailed 
and articulate statements of grievances. 
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The genesis of the Suffolk Resolves lay with the Boston Committee of 
Correspondence’s call for a meeting of Suffolk County gentlemen to consider an appropriate 
response to the Coercive Acts. The Boston delegation to the Suffolk meeting, selected by the 
Committee of Correspondence under the direction of Warren, included him, Benjamin 
Church, John Pitts, Benjamin Kent, and Oliver Wendell.18 The first Suffolk meeting 
commenced on August 16th, but took no real action other than planning for a future meeting 
on September 6th.19 Apparently, delegates feared taking decisive action as a number of towns 
had not yet appointed representatives. They wanted to ensure the fullest possible participation 
to legitimize their actions.20 Warren took the lead in planning the Suffolk              
Convention, but continued to correspond with Samuel Adams during the latter’s time in 
Philadelphia. Adams’ role from afar drew comment from contemporaries like Joseph 
Galloway who saw Adams as managing “at once the faction in Congress at Philadelphia and 
the faction in New England.”21 Later historians, such as David Ammerman, have debated the 
topic as well. Ammerman referred to the “conspiratorial hand” of Adams throughout the 
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backroom channels.22 T.H. Breen, however, challenged this, arguing that popular radicalism 
rather than a conspiracy of prominent men dominated the Suffolk Convention.23 
Simultaneously with the Suffolk Convention, a meeting of delegates from twelve of 
the colonies convened in Philadelphia. Following the arrival of the Port Bill in May 1774, 
various colonies requested a congress to discuss policies of resistance from an intercolonial 
perspective, not just through local efforts. Historian Merrill Jensen described the complexity 
of this task to create a policy-making body for all of the North American colonies and the 
precedent it set: “The intricate political maneuvering of American leaders as they brought 
about an agreement to meet in a congress, and elected delegates to it, resembled in many 
ways the politics involved in every congressional election from that day to this.”24 The two 
primary purposes of this body, later known as the First Continental Congress, were to push 
for the repeal of the Coercive Acts and to end Parliamentary taxation. However, the delegates 
quickly found themselves confronted with philosophical debates over larger issues of 
Parliamentary authority in general, as well as specific petitions from the county conventions. 
The First Continental Congress, from the beginning, included delegates with varying 
motives and political views who “were determined to present a united front to the world, no 
matter how sharply they divided in their secret session.”25 This created an overall body of 
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“abandoned hope of reconciliation,” namely delegates such as Samuel Adams, Thomas 
Mifflin, Richard Henry Lee, Christopher Gadsden, and perhaps John Adams. The remainder 
of delegates, like Joseph Galloway and other conservatives, wanted “peace and harmony” 
with the mother country.26 In fact, many conservatives, notably ones from New York and 
Philadelphia, had hoped that the First Continental Congress “could be delayed or avoided” 
altogether.27 The delegates first met at a tavern in Philadelphia on September 5th and the 
divide between the patriot and conservative leaders became pronounced. The first two 
decisions, to meet in Carpenter’s Hall as opposed to Galloway’s suggestion of the State 
House and the election of Peyton Randolph, speaker of the Virginia House of Burgesses, as 
President and appointment of Charles Thomson, a Philadelphia patriot, as Secretary, signaled 
the first of many victories for patriot leaders, while “mortifying” conservatives.28 
Additionally, the delegates debated and selected a voting system in which each colony 
received one vote, requiring a simple majority of each colony’s delegation.29 
During the period between the first and second Suffolk meetings and amidst the 
opening of the Continental Congress, an event known as the Cambridge Powder Alarm 
heightened tensions. Governor Gage ordered a detachment of British troops into Cambridge 
to collect a stockpile of gunpowder on September 5, 1774. This movement of forces sent fear 
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Massachusetts and surrounding colonies quickly formed informal militias and converged on 
Cambridge. The British forces had left the area by the time the militias organized, but the 
crowd continued to harass royal officials, including the mandamus counselors, leading to the 
resignation of several mandamus counselors.30 This spontaneous mobilization, though not 
called on to fight, sparked confidence that colonists could gather a force of their own to 
challenge British forces. Knowledge that colonists with no direct stake in Boston’s plight 
rushed “to help strangers who were victims of aggression” encouraged a newfound sense of 
shared identity.31 
False rumors of the destruction of Boston as a result of Governor Gage’s order spread 
throughout the colonies. The false reports created concern and heightened fears, while 
serving as a reminder that any incident could lead to harsh military response.32 Boston could 
no longer afford to wait for Congressional deliberations and moved forward with developing 
their own responses to British actions. In Philadelphia, delegates anxiously awaited news 
from Boston. In a letter to Abigail Adams on September 18, 1774, John Adams alluded to the 
tensions in the First Continental Congress created as a direct result of the Cambridge Powder 
Alarm: “… When the horrid news was brought here of the bombardment of Boston, which 
made us completely miserable for two days, we saw proofs both of the sympathy and the 
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which would have done honor to the oratory of a Briton or a Roman. If it had proved true, 
you would have heard the thunder of an American Congress”.33 
The Cambridge Powder Alarm demonstrated the support and commitment of the 
people of the surrounding areas to Boston. Events such as the Boston Tea Party and the 
Cambridge Powder Alarm displayed the lengths the people of Massachusetts would take to 
defend their economic and physical security, but also emboldened other colonists to stand up 
against British restrictions. It was in this atmosphere that the Suffolk Convention adopted the 
Resolves and the First Continental Congress took them under advisement. This shifted the 
tenor of the Suffolk Convention, resulting in a document that crystallized anti-British 
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THE SUFFOLK CONVENTION AND RESOLVES 
 
 
The Suffolk Convention encompassed nineteen towns from across the entire county 
with more than seventy total delegates.1 The delegates were generally selected by special 
town meetings called for that purpose, and sources indicate that every town and district sent 
representatives to the September meetings.2 The September 6th meeting was similar to the 
first Suffolk Convention meeting; however, extensive planning went into executing this 
session, including an early draft of the Suffolk Resolves by William Cooper and, presumably, 
Joseph Warren. Cooper formulated a set of proposed minutes for the September 6th meeting 
that included a push for bloc-town voting to promote unanimity throughout the convention, 
followed by a discussion of possible resolves. Warren also promoted a unified voice 
throughout the convention by creating a committee to consider county policy and placing 
himself as the chairman.3 The Suffolk County delegates represented a wide range of 
professions and occupations suggesting broad representation of the public interest. Attendees 
included professionals like physicians Joseph Warren and Benjamin Church and lawyers 
including William Holden and Nathanial Summer. The presence of individuals like Deacon 
Joseph Palmer indicates the involvement of the county’s churchmen in the debates. Millers 
Edward Preston and James Boise represented the manufacturing sector. Particularly well- 
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represented were military men including Major Richard Woodward, Colonel Ebenezer 
Thayer, and Captain Benjamin White.4 The absence of acknowledged leaders like the Adams 
cousins and Thomas Cushing, who had been appointed as delegates for Massachusetts to the 
First Continental Congress, provided unique opportunities for lesser-known men to rise to the 
forefront. 
The Suffolk Convention continued at the home of Daniel Vose, a local West Indian 
goods merchant and Tavern owner, on September 9th. An early version of the Suffolk 
Resolves appeared in the minutes of the September 6th meeting, but Warren made significant 
changes prior to submitting it for discussion during the September 9th meeting.5 The original 
draft had been relatively moderate in tone and recommendations, but the revised draft 
submitted for approval was “designed to express a forthright commitment to a program of 
resistance” without alienating the other colonies.6 The authors “fashioned a strategy of civil 
disobedience, but not passive resistance.”7 The Suffolk convention “staked out an extreme 
position” in order to combat Parliamentary policy, specifically the Coercive Acts.8 Delegates 
approved the Suffolk Resolves on September 9th, but Warren controlled the distribution of 
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selecting Paul Revere to deliver them to the First Continental Congress, perhaps to avoid 
premature exposure to colonial administrators and loyalists.9 
The text of the document, the sentiments of which are mirrored in the text of other 
county resolves, reflects tension and frustration of the colonists towards Parliament, while 
paying lip service to respect for King George III. A newfound assertiveness is expressed 
throughout the Resolves further illustrating the shift in the mindset of Massachusetts citizens; 
they now see themselves as the rightful leaders of the colony, not obedient servants of 
Parliament. The document showcases the progression towards war that began to surface in 
the colonial American mindset following events like the Cambridge Powder Alarm. The 
many issues that define the American Revolution, such as taxation without representation, 
trade interference and right to a fair trial, are extensively highlighted within the Suffolk 
Resolves. The document defined contentious issues more clearly, helping to crystallize the 
growing distance between Britain and her American colonies. 
The text contains an opening preamble, followed by nineteen specific grievances. The 
preamble demonstrates the high regard in which Massachusetts held their charter, despite the 
growth of independent colonial governments. The opening statement is filled with hostile 
terms directed at British colonial administrators such as: “powerful,” “vengeful,” “arbitrary,” 
“licentious,” and “parricide.” British administrative personnel are described as “military 
executioners” and accused of economic exploitation, while their actions are described as 
“unparalleled usurpation[s] of unconstitutional power.” Warren juxtaposes the strident and 
exaggerated characterization of the British administrators against the colonists by depicting 
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the latter as “guiltless children” laboring to protect an inheritance built on the “valor and 
blood” of colonial ancestors. Warren also attacks those who “tamely submit to live, move, 
and have their being at the arbitrary will of a licentious minister,” describing their position as 
analogous to that of “voluntary slavery.”10 These sentiments sparked emotional connections 
between the colonists, thereby forging common bonds against the British. Warren knew that 
in order to stand any chance at making an impact on Parliament the colonists would have to 
put aside their differences and show a united front. 
The body of the document contains nineteen grievances or points. Interestingly, the 
first point emphasizes that loyalty must be maintained to King George III, based on the 
traditional Lockean concept of the social contract. It acknowledges George III as “our 
rightful sovereign” and promises allegiance with the understanding that the compact with the 
original colonists forms the “covenant [which] is the tenure and claim on which are founded 
our allegiance and submission.”11 This type of outward adherence to the rule of the monarchy 
gives the Suffolk Resolves an intermediary position. Colonists had not given up completely 
on all aspects of their mother country, but they acknowledged the disintegration of relations 
which had already begun. The expression of loyalty masks deeper discontent highlighted in 
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Many colonists were most upset with Parliament in 1774 because of the limitations  
on personal and economic freedoms contained within the Coercive Acts. Because of this, the 
third and fourth grievances specifically targeted Parliament. The Resolves castigated that 
body “for blocking up the harbor of Boston, for altering the established form of government 
in this colony, and for screening the most flagitious violators of the laws of the province from 
a legal trial,” which the delegates deemed as entitlements “by the laws of nature, the British 
constitution, and the charter of the province.”13 This particular complaint also provides a 
perfect example of the disconnect between Great Britain and its American colonists. Great 
Britain was willing to sacrifice revenue to bring the troublesome Bostonians in line, which 
the colonists saw as a sign of tyranny. In their minds “the attempts of [a] wicked 
administration to enslave America” freed them from obligations of obedience.14 
Court and legal issues comprised the fifth through eighth grievances within the 
Resolves. The court systems and justices had forfeited their legitimacy and authority in the 
eyes of the colonists. The delegates to the Suffolk Convention considered the justices 
“unconstitutional officers” who operated under “undue influence” as their illegitimate 
appointments were not, in colonial minds, consistent with the original charter.15 This hints at 
the developing radicalism inherent in the Suffolk Resolves. The Whigs in Massachusetts 
began to promote the American colonies as separate entities from the mainland of Great 









they wanted control of their own affairs, but with continued protection and trade benefits 
under British law. 
The Resolves also suggested aggressive actions in terms of boycotting British trade 
and calling for certain individuals to resign their public offices, even issuing an ultimatum 
that those refusing to do so by September 20th would be considered as “obstinate and 
incorrigible enemies to this country.”16 The colonists took this a step further in the ninth 
through twelfth grievances by recommending the removal of commissions of militia 
members and advocating that the inhabitants of the colony should prepare to defend 
themselves, if it became necessary. These points of protest came in reaction to the increased 
military presence throughout Massachusetts and the newfound threat towards Protestantism 
following the protection of the Roman-Catholic religion in Canada. The colonies maintained 
a defensive posture towards military relations with Britain out of “affection to his majesty” 
and as long as “such conduct may be vindicated by reason and the principles of self- 
preservation.”17 This stance further illustrates the transitional nature the Suffolk Resolves 
held in regards to movement towards revolution. 
The thirteenth through nineteenth resolves outline specific measures to create an 
independent government to combat the “present tyrannical and unconstitutional 
government.” The Resolves present an ultimatum to British authorities, threatening that in 








those seized by the British were freed. A call for Anglo-American trade cessation and the 
development of American art and manufacturing to offset this boycott of British goods 
constituted the next step in the Resolves’ plan. The sixteenth and seventeenth grievances 
supported and encouraged other towns and counties to support the Provincial Congress, 
meeting later in October, and the currently sitting Continental Congress. Finally, in an effort 
to counteract the surge of mob-like activities and riots and to allow the colonial elites to 
reassert their leadership of the resistance, the Resolves called for civil order, particularly the 
protection of private property.18 
The content and sentiments of the Suffolk Resolves clearly resonated with other 
colonial gatherings. The minutes from the Bristol Convention suggest that the way in which 
Suffolk County responded to British policies in their “spirited and noble resolutions” echoed 
their own feelings. The Bristol County convention “cheerfully” adopted the Suffolk Resolves 
within their own resolutions.19 The Cumberland Convention demonstrated the same support 
to Suffolk County as leaders in this challenge to British policy, while also showing 
awareness of differences between their two situations: “And here we think it proper to 
observe, that though we do not coincide in every instance with our Suffolk brethren, which 
may be owing to a want of knowing all the circumstances of affairs, yet we highly applaud 
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On September 10th, Warren sent a copy of the document to the First Continental 
Congress in Philadelphia with his trusted ally, Paul Revere. In terms of content, the Suffolk 
Resolves were similar to the other county resolutions, though more fully developed than 
most. They were not the first set of resolutions to arrive from Massachusetts; Middlesex 
County sent a copy of their proceedings three days earlier. However, the Suffolk Resolves 
were the only resolutions brought to a vote before the Congress. Thomas Cushing, a delegate 
from Massachusetts, suggested one reason as to why Congress agreed to address the Suffolk 
Resolves directly in a letter addressed to Richard Devens and Isaac Foster, Jr. on September 
19, 1774. According to Cushing, “the Congress were very Busy & several large Committees 
were closely engaged upon matters of great importance” when the Middlesex resolutions 
arrived.21 More importantly, the heightened tension created by the false rumors following the 
Cambridge Powder Alarm would have made Boston’s pleas seem more urgent. The fact that 
Boston, the most threatened city, was part of Suffolk County insured that Congress would be 
more receptive to that county’s pleas.22 A letter penned by Virginia delegate Richard Henry 
Lee to his brother William on September 20, 1774, speaks of hearing of the Alarm and the 
respect delegates held for the preparedness of so many to die for the cause.23 Samuel 
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Alarm, commenting that “It served also to inflame the congress and to prepare the way for 
another Boston maneuvere [sic].”24   During his discussion of the proceedings of the 
Congress, Seabury asserted that “Their [the Philadelphia delegates] passions were up, their 
reason disturbed, their judgment distorted; with the most inconsiderate rashness they took the 
fatal step of adopting a resolution ‘approving and recommending’ the conduct of the Suffolk 
people.”25 
The importance placed on the Resolves may also have resulted from a strategic 
decision to frame their transmission to the Continental Congress as seeking advice. The 
Suffolk Resolves reached the Congress later, but leaders enclosed a letter with “an express 
application to the Congress for advice.”26 Therefore, they would both flatter the delegates of 
the First Continental Congress, while forcing their hand and causing them to take a stand. 
This introductory letter and request for action, coupled with the tensions over the Powder 
Alarm, created a sense of urgency in Congress. Historian Ray Raphael touches upon the 
subject of flattery in terms of the Resolves being crafted with flair that would impress the 
“learned delegates” more than other more mundane documents.27 Perhaps most important is 
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of other counties. They offered the most detailed and articulate statement of colonial 
grievances. 
Regardless of the reasons, the Philadelphia delegates brought the Suffolk Resolves to 
the floor for consideration. The resolutions proved to be a divisive issue for the First 
Continental Congress and quickly became central to the larger ideological divide. Radicals 
like Christopher Gadsen, a noted South Carolina delegate and an extreme patriot, wanted a 
preemptive attack before Britain could reinforce troops.28 The conservative members, like 
Galloway, still hoped for peaceful reconciliation, causing them to question the entire nature 
of the Continental Congress. In his 1779 pamphlet Letters to a Nobleman, On the Conduct of 
the War in the Middle Colonies, Galloway challenged the supposed popular support of the 
Continental Congress, pointing out that in some colonies many of the government officers 
were either leaders of the patriot faction or secretly supported it.29 In his thinking, the 
Continental Congress constituted an illegitimate body as it undermined the authority of the 
legitimate colonial assemblies.30 He argued that calling a Continental Congress violated 
“those rights which they complained of in others” and that the “violent few proceeded to 
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Congress.”31 He further claimed that the instructions of the First Continental Congress only 
authorized measures which supported “allegiance to their Sovereign, and that tended to unite, 
and not to separate the two countries,” 32 thus making their consideration of the Suffolk 
Resolves also illegitimate. 
Nonetheless, Galloway and others found themselves forced into taking a stand on the 
specific issue of the Suffolk Resolves. The conservative members expressed shock and 
viewed the proposed adoption of the Resolves as essentially asking them to condone open 
rebellion and, potentially, military resistance. They found themselves caught in a dilemma, 
which Galloway later claimed resulted from coercion and fear of retribution from Adams’ 
mob.33 Galloway’s 1780 pamphlet Historical and Political Reflections on the Rise and 
Progress of the American Rebellion, defended the reputations of himself and other loyalist 
members of the Congress by recounting “long and warm debate” of the meetings and 
discrediting the notion of unanimity in regard to the validation of the Suffolk Resolves.34 He 
suggested that the presumed unanimity was in fact coerced, claiming that Sam Adams’ group 
operated as a “mob, ready to execute their secret orders” through the “cruel practice of 
tarring and feathering.” He further claimed that two dissenting members “presumed to offer 
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that “their protest and its negative should be entered on the minutes.”35 Historian Ray 
Raphael denies the charges of coercion made by Galloway and claims that the conservatives’ 
votes more likely represent an acceptance that the tide had turned and a fear of being branded 
traitors if they appeared to be supporting the unpopular Coercive Acts. Rejecting the 
Resolves would imply agreement with British policy.36 
While individuals within colonial delegations may have opposed the endorsement of 
the Suffolk Resolves, official records indicate that Congress unanimously approved these 
resolutions as each colony voted as a unit. It took several weeks of debate to bridge this 
ideological divide and to many the Suffolk Resolves seemed an acceptable middle ground 
between Galloway and Gadsden.37 The Congressional endorsement effectively undermined 
the more conservative Galloway Plan, which came before the Congress on September 17, 
1774, and served as “an indication of success of hardliners at the First Continental 
Congress.”38 The delegates did, however, urge caution and temperance, supporting only 
defensive actions in an effort to give Congress time to negotiate with Britain to seek changes 
in policy. The Resolves could thus be seen as a compromise, preventing the possibility of a 







36 Raphael, 157; Jensen, The Founding of a Nation, 495. 
 
37 Smith, A New Age Now Begins, 434. 
 
38 Richard Middleton, Colonial America: A History, 1565-1776, 3rd (Maiden: 
Blackwell, 2002), 472-473. For more information on the Galloway Plan, see Jensen, The 
Founding of a Nation, 498-500. 
38  
could call in reinforcements.39 This approach satisfied the patriots, while easing conservative 
concerns.40 The delegates hoped to prevent further disruption in New England, while sending 
a message to the British government that punitive actions to attempt to regain control of the 
situation would not be tolerated.41 
Additionally, the Congress, in what John Adams referred to as an unusual display of 
public transparency, opted to break with their previous secrecy policy by ordering the 
Resolves to be printed in local newspapers.42 The Resolves made page one news as seen in a 
special September 15, 1774 Supplement to the Massachusetts Gazette, the Essex Gazette of 
September 20, 1774, and the New Hampshire Gazette of September 23, 1774.43 The 
November 1774 issue of London’s Gentleman’s Magazine published excerpts from the 
“Debates in the House of Commons,” including a report entitled “Account of the Proceedings 
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paraphrased version of the Suffolk Resolves.44 General Gage later sent his superiors in 
England a copy of the Resolves along with the Declaration of Rights and Grievances in late 
1774.45 
Following the First Continental Congress’ decision to endorse the Suffolk Resolves, 
the majority, on both sides, was no longer prepared to compromise.46 Additionally, as 
Revolutionary War archivist and author Todd Andrlik argued, “by sanctioning the Resolves, 
Congress supported deeds as well as words. It vowed to stand behind a revolution that was in 
full swing throughout Massachusetts.”47 Furthermore, the Resolves contributed to the unity 
or “Common Cause” of the colonies because the approval essentially condoned measures the 
colonists knew Britain would view as treasonous.48 It also strengthened the resolve of the 
British cabinet; despite their promise to consider the actions of the First Continental 
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The Continental Congress’ endorsement of the Resolves prompted strong reactions in 
both American and British circles. Early historians shed light on the collective response to 
the endorsement. Mercy Otis Warren, a supporter of the American Revolution, argued that 
the treasonous sentiments contained in the Suffolk Resolves reflected the mindset of the 
colonists as a whole, not just those of Massachusetts.1 David Ramsey, another American 
sympathizer and historian who saw his writings as “a vehicle for fostering nationhood,” 
expressed similar observations towards the passage of the Suffolk Resolves as Warren.2 
Ramsay described the passage of the Resolves by the First Continental Congress as an event 
which allowed the people of Massachusetts to “determine what support they might expect” 
and stated that the endorsement of the resolutions in the end surpassed the expectations of the 
inhabitants of Suffolk County. He further asserted that this brought legitimacy and 
confidence to the actions of Massachusetts, encouraging further resistance.3 Although the 
accounts of these early American historians shed light on the outlook of pro-revolutionary 
segments of the populace in response to the Suffolk Resolves, Warren and Ramsay 
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sources of direct responses to the endorsement of the Resolves offer a better depiction of the 
contemporary reaction to this event both in America and Britain. 
The most immediate reactions can be seen in the letters and writings of delegates to 
the First Continental Congress, which provide insight into the responses of prominent, 
politically active citizens. The delegates clearly recognized the importance of the Resolves. 
Comments range from simple mentions of Congress’ actions to passionate statements 
regarding the proceedings and the Suffolk Resolves. A letter from George Read, a member of 
the Delaware delegation, to his wife Gertrude Read on September 18, 1774, reflected the 
sense of urgency that delegates felt and a realization of the importance of the moment. He 
informed his wife that he regretted not being able to visit with her, but that he was 
nonetheless glad that he had remained in Philadelphia as two major points of discussion 
occurred “in consequence of an application from Boston to the Congress for their advice 
upon the late measures of General Gage.”  Read clearly saw these two matters, the passage of 
the Suffolk Resolves and a resolution for further colonial support of Boston, as quite 
significant as he stated that he would have blamed himself had he not been there to 
participate in the discussion.4 
Richard Henry Lee, an influential delegate from Virginia, in a letter addressed to his 
brother, William Lee, on September 20, 1774, noted that the Suffolk Resolves received 
“concurring support” for Boston and Massachusetts as a whole.5 He understood that recent 
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events showed that “no small difficulty will attend forcing submission from these people, and 
they are most firmly resolved to dye [sic] rather than submit to the change of the 
Government.” 
Two dispatches from delegates from Connecticut show that contemporary 
participants considered the Suffolk Resolves as important business of the First Continental 
Congress and recognized it as a unifying measure. A group of delegates from Connecticut 
sent a letter to Jonathan Trumbull, Sr., governor of the Connecticut colony, on October 10, 
1774, which stated that the Suffolk Resolves were “highly approved of & applauded.”6   Silas 
Deane, another prominent delegate representing Connecticut, wrote to Thomas Mumford, 
Connecticut merchant and member of the Council of Safety, on October 16, 1774, that 
through the adoption of resolutions, such as the Suffolk Resolves, the Continental Congress 
made the “Cause of Boston” a “Common Cause.”7 
Not surprisingly two prominent delegates from Massachusetts recorded immediate 
responses to the Suffolk Resolves as well. John Adams penned a diary entry on September 
17, 1774, remarking on the adoption of the Resolves by the First Continental Congress and 
the sense of unity its endorsement represented. He wrote, “This was one of the happiest Days 
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Day convinced me that America will support the Massachusetts [sic] or perish with her.”8 
However, in a letter to Abigail Adams, he hinted at the overarching divisions which existed 
in the First Continental Congress under the supposed unanimity. He recorded that he 
witnessed “tears gush into the eyes of the pacifist Pennsylvania Quakers.”9 Samuel Adams, 
who had been heavily involved through communications with his protégé Joseph Warren 
throughout the development of the Suffolk Resolves, wrote to Warren shortly after the 
Resolves reached the Continental Congress in Philadelphia. Adams remarked on September 
19, 1774, that the “spirited and Patriotick [sic] Resolves” of Suffolk County “were read with 
great applause, and the Enclosed Resolutions were unanimously passed, which give you a 
faint idea of the spirit of Congress.”10 However, Samuel Adams did not limit his excitement 
over the passage of the Resolves to only Warren. In a letter to Boston Congregationalist 
minister Charles Chauncy also dated September 19, 1774, Adams used essentially the same 
language.11 Together, the letters to Warren and Chauncy indicate Samuel Adams’ recognition 
that the passage of the Resolves marked a shift in the spirit of the Congress. 
Samuel Adams continued to communicate with Warren through various letters, 
further revealing his sense that the Suffolk Resolves had forever altered political discourse. 
He suggested that the passage of the Resolves had altered intercolonial relations and created 
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resentment.12 In a letter of September 25, 1774, Adams apprised Warren of fears of some of 
the delegates that Massachusetts aimed for true independence, not just independence from 
Britain. Adams wrote: “There is, however, a certain degree of jealousy in the minds of some, 
that we aim at a total independency, not only of the mother-country, but of the colonies too; 
and that, as we are hardy and brave people, we shall have in time overrun them all.”13 
The excitement originally produced by the adoption of the Resolves among 
Massachusetts leaders proved to be short lived, as evidenced by a letter from John Adams to 
Joseph Palmer, Boston glassmaker and later member of the Massachusetts Provincial 
Congress, on September 26, 1774. John Adams related his frustration with Congress for 
applauding the Resolves, but not following through. He complained of being told to “stand 
still, bear, with patience, if you come to a rupture with the troops, all is lost.” He further 
informed Palmer that the delegates found any notion of independence to be startling.14 That 
frustration is further shown in a letter written three days later to Boston lawyer William 
Tudor, asserting that Congress praised “our wisdom, fortitude, and temperance,” while taking 
no action.15 Nonetheless, these dispatches from the Adams cousins to multiple Boston leaders 
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granted by the First Continental Congress, but also warned of the concerns the majority of 
the Congress had with the potential for full independence it foreshadowed. 
While patriot leaders like the Adams cousins welcomed the approval of the Suffolk 
Resolves and its acknowledgement of a common cause in resisting British policy, not 
everyone agreed. Loyalist sentiments remained strong and significantly impacted the colonial 
discourse. As T.H. Breen has argued, “Americans of loyalist persuasion wondered whether 
the Philadelphia delegates had taken leave of their senses.” One critic observed, half “of 
America shudder [ed].”16 To loyalists, whether delegate or concerned citizen, the Suffolk 
Resolves threatened division rather than promoting unity. 
Joseph Galloway, a moderate delegate (and later loyalist) from Pennsylvania to the 
First Continental Congress, vehemently opposed the Suffolk Resolves and served as one of 
the leading conservative voices. In a letter of November 1, 1774, addressed to Thomas 
Nickleson, Galloway’s brother-in-law, Galloway wrote: “You will no doubt see the Resolves 
of our Congress and their other Proceedings. I cannot say that I approve of them, they are too 
warm & indiscreet and in my Opinion have not pursued the right Path to an Accommodation. 
All the Violent Parts of them I strenuously oppose from Conscience & Judgment and because 
I was convinced they must widen the Differences between us.”17 In Galloway’s opinion, the 
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delegates had “violated” the trust of their constituents and pushed the people into an armed 
confrontation.18 
Galloway’s sentiments did not improve with time. In the 1780 pamphlet Historical 
and Political Reflections on the Rise and Progress of the American Rebellion, he discussed 
the impact of the Suffolk Resolves in greater detail. He described them as “inflammatory 
resolves... which contained a complete declaration of war against Great-Britain [sic].” He 
continued with a condensed description of the “treasonable” contents of the Resolves. 
Galloway took the issue of endorsement of the Suffolk Resolves a step further than in his 
previous pamphlets by arguing that the “treasonable vote” of the First Continental Congress 
laid the foundation of military resistance throughout America.” 19 From that point, he 
believed that the loyalists had little hope of stemming the tide and switched his focus to 
trying to ensure that the separation from Great Britain yielded a system built on constitutional 
principles and working toward a reconciliation of the two countries.20 Galloway ended this 
pamphlet by illuminating the connection between the passage of the Suffolk Resolves and the 
events of Lexington and Concord, stating that “the militia in New England become 
embodied, in pursuance of the recommendation of the Suffolk resolve, and magazines of 
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Gage sent out a party, which was attacked by the militia at Lexington.”21 In essence, 
Galloway situated the beginning of the conflict not in the events of Lexington and Concord, 
but in the endorsement of the Suffolk Resolves. 
Galloway’s sentiments are echoed in the writings of Samuel Seabury, a New York 
loyalist and Anglican clergyman. He served as one of the first pamphlet writers to attack the 
actions of the First Continental Congress. He produced four pamphlets between November 
1774 and January 1775 urging the rejection of policies adopted by the Congress.22 In The 
Congress Canvassed: Or, An Examination into the Conduct of the Delegates, At Their Grand 
Convention, Seabury pointed out many of the same issues with the proceedings of the First 
Continental Congress as Galloway. However, unlike Galloway, Seabury completed his 
response within a few months of the actual meeting. Seabury argued that instead of unifying 
the colonies and the motherland, Congress made the “breach with the parent state a thousand 
times more irreparable than it was before.” He used the adoption of the Suffolk Resolves as 
an example of colonial policies which “tend to raise jealousies, to excite animosities, to 
foment discords between us [the colonies] and our mother country,” while offering no “peace 
and reconciliation.”23 Seabury also referred to the surprise felt by many of the loyalist 
persuasion at the actions of the First Continental Congress: “Their characters, their stations, 
their abilities…all concurred to raise my expectations that they would have been of principal 
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advantage in the congress, by moderating and keeping within the bounds the fiery 
intemperate zeal, which it was too apparent, many of the Delegates carried with them to that 
assembly. Cruelly was I disappointed, when the account was confirmed, that the congress 
had unanimously adopted the Suffolk Resolves.”24 Seabury, along with other loyalists, felt 
the adoption of the radical Suffolk Resolves effectively limited the influence of more 
moderate delegates. Another prominent New York loyalist, Myles Cooper, expressed similar 
discontent in A Friendly Address to All Reasonable Republicans, referring to the Resolves as 
the work of “rebellious Republicans” and claiming “that the people of Suffolk had OPENLY 
REVOLTED FROM THEIR ALLEGIANCE to the King and his government.”25 
Thomas Bradbury Chandler, a New Jersey Anglican clergyman, offered a more 
extreme viewpoint on loyalist discontent towards the actions of the First Continental 
Congress, specifically in regards to the actions of the delegates and people of Massachusetts, 
in pamphlets published in 1774 and early 1775. In A Friendly Address to All Reasonable 
Americans, on the Subject of our Political Confusions, Chandler provided his opinion of the 
Bostonians and leaders of the Massachusetts delegation: “they must be viewed in the light of 
vanquished rebels, and treated accordingly. Their leaders must be given up into the 
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must be left at the mercy of their vanquishers.”26 Chandler echoed the sentiments of Seabury 
in regard to the Continental Congress’ failure to live up to his expectations, nothing that “the 
Gentlemen of the Congress, in whom we confided as the faithful guardians of the safety as 
well as rights of America, were disposed to enter into a league offensive and defensive with 
its worst enemies the New England and other Presbyterian Republicans.” He continued that 
“The fact is notorious to the world; it can neither be denied nor palliated; for they hastily and 
eagerly published…their cordial approbation of the Suffolk Resolves for erecting an 
Independent Government in New-England.”27 Chandler viewed the endorsement of the 
Suffolk Resolves as the event which shifted everything from bad to worse, going so far as to 
say that “a rebellion is evidently commenced in New England, in the county of Suffolk, 
without room for retreating.”28 
Chandler’s What Think Ye of the Congress Now? offered further commentary on the 
significance of the Suffolk Resolves from the viewpoint of a prominent loyalist. He provided 
a brief summary of the Resolves themselves and stated that they contained the ingredients of 
a “DECLARATION of INDEPENDENCY.”29 Furthermore, Chandler reiterated his earlier 
claim that the passage of the Resolves amounted to “an open revolt and rebellion” 
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germinating from the “people of Suffolk.” 30 As soon as the First Continental Congress 
“received by express, an authentic copy of the above-mentioned Suffolk Resolves, they broke 
through all their rules of secrecy, and, at once, gave such a blast from the trumpet of sedition, 
as made one half of America shudder.” 31 He further claimed that “they [the First Continental 
Congress] ought to have sent back [the Suffolk Resolves] with indignation and 
abhorrence.”32 Chandler, like many other loyalists, saw the adoption of the Resolves as the 
event which started open rebellion and believed that it did not reflect the interests of the 
colonies as a whole. 
Word of the passage of the Suffolk Resolves spread widely due to the decree of the 
Continental Congress that they be published in newspapers, which allowed for responses 
from those outside formal political circles. For instance, when officers of the Dunmore’s War 
campaign received word of the Suffolk Resolves, they adopted the Fort Gower Resolutions, 
“their own bold assertion of colonial rights and complaints.”33 
As colonial media historian David Copeland shows, colonial newspapers primarily 
addressed local concerns or issues and events that directly impacted the local population.34 
Therefore, the printing of the Suffolk Resolves in colonies beyond Massachusetts suggests 
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that they were considered to be of wide significance. Newspapers such as the Virginia 
Gazette, the Pennsylvania Packet, the Massachusetts Gazette, the Essex Gazette, the New 
Hampshire Gazette, and the Maryland Gazette either reprinted the Suffolk Resolves entirely 
following their adoption by the First Continental Congress or included excerpts of Gage’s 
reactions to such events.35 In many instances, the Suffolk Resolves graced the front page, 
further testifying to the interest in the document. However, the papers generally simply 
included the text or key points without comment. 
British commentators reacted strongly to the adoption of the Suffolk Resolves by the 
First Continental Congress, offering more in-depth commentary than American newspapers. 
The Annual Register of London (a yearly compilation of critical world events) presented the 
fortification of Boston and the Cambridge Powder Alarm as creating “the most violent and 
universal ferment that had yet be known” and influencing the Suffolk Convention to endorse 
stronger measures than any previous attempt at protesting the actions of Parliament.36 
Additionally, The Annual Register noted various county conventions throughout the 
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congress, of not submitting to the payment of any internal taxes, that were not, as usual, 
imposed by their own assemblies, and of suspending all commerce with the mother country, 
until the American grievances in general, and those of Massachusetts-Bay in particular, were 
fully redressed.”37 
The Annual Register also provided a summary of Gage’s response and delivered 
interesting commentary on the aftermath in Boston of these actions, “Those of Boston, either 
were, or pretended to be, under continual terror, from the apprehensions of immediate 
danger, to their lives. They were in the hands of an armed force whom they abhorred, and 
who equally detested them… Each side professed the best intentions in the world for itself, 
and shewed [sic] the greatest suspicion of the other.”38 The publishers of The Annual 
Register considered the attempt of merging varying colonial interests into one unified body 
through the First Continental Congress “undoubtedly a dangerous experiment to bring 
matters to this crisis” and questioned the need for secrecy.39 Since the Declaration of Rights 
and Grievances, a considerably milder set of resolutions, was described as a document that 
“rather reproaches us [the British] with a shameful degeneracy,”40 the harsher Suffolk 
Resolves would likely have drawn similar sentiments. The Suffolk Resolves were reprinted, 
sometimes even separately from the other proceedings of the First Continental Congress, in a 
number of newspapers, including the Gentleman’s Magazine, London Evening Post, The 
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Morning Chronicle and London Advertiser, and The Southampton Hampshire Chronicle.41 
An unidentified newspaper report claimed that British “friends of America” would take 
comfort in knowing that endorsement of the Resolves “confounded the ministry, as by it they 
perceive the Union of the Colonies to be complete.”42Although little commentary was 
included with the reprints, the fact that a group of county-level colonial resolutions made the 
British news suggests their significance in the eyes of at least some segments of the British 
public. 
British officials, in a variety of capacities, commented directly on the Suffolk 
Resolves, expressing great alarm at the outright rebellion they saw in the resolutions. 
Massachusetts Governor Thomas Gage received an address, in addition to a copy of the 
Suffolk Resolves, from the Suffolk Convention, printed in The Pennsylvania Gazette on 
September 21, 1774. This address requested Gage’s comment on the Suffolk Resolves and 
again reiterated that “the people of this county are by no means disposed to injure his 
Majestytroops [sic]; they think themselves aggrieved and oppressed by the late acts of 
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inclination to commence a war with his Majestytroops [sic].”43 Gage submitted a short 
response on September 15,1774, printed in The Pennsylvania Gazette on September 28, 
1774. Gage attempted to smooth things over by defending the “general good behavior” of the 
soldiers and questioning the removal of guns “privately in the night from the battery in 
Charlestown” by Boston citizens. He further stated, “The refusing submission to the late acts 
of Parliament, I find general throughout the province, and I shall lay the same before his 
Majesty.”44 The Suffolk Convention responded once more by providing clear examples of 
abuse by the troops and reiterating the need for the reopening of the port “as nature has 
formed it” and arguing that “the most hounourable method of making them [the colonists] 
secure and safe, will be to give the people of the province the strongest proof that no design 
is forming against their liberties.”45 John Richard Alden, a biographer of Gage, described the 
Governor as “polite and gracious to delegations” from Suffolk County and said he “displayed 
prudence and coolness” towards the colonists during the situation.46 Bernard Donoughue 
claimed that “Gage’s dispatches revealed that the Commander-In-Chief’s morale was 
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of 1774, Gage sounds like a prophet of doom in describing the changes in American affairs. 
On September 25, 1774, Gage wrote that the Americans had taken the Coercive Acts as a 
challenge and remarked on November 2, 1774, that the colonists would rather fight than give 
in.48 On September 17, 1774, in a letter to Thomas Hutchinson, Gage urged the government 
to suspend the Coercive Acts and ask Massachusetts to send emissaries to London in an 
attempt to alleviate the issues illustrated in the Suffolk Resolves. Otherwise, he stated he 
would need 20,000 additional troops to end the rebellion.49 
Governor Gage’s predecessor, Thomas Hutchinson, also reacted directly to the 
endorsement of the Suffolk Resolves. Upon hearing of the news, he commented that the vote 
was “more alarming than anything which has yet been done.” Bernard Bailyn, in The Ordeal 
of Thomas Hutchinson, argues that the passage of the Resolves transformed Hutchinson’s 
world – the plan he had worked out was “now totally irrelevant.”50 Hutchinson is quoted as 
stating that the passage of the Suffolk Resolves “are enough to put it out of my power to 
make any accommodation.”51 He further recounted meeting with Lord Dartmouth, Secretary 
of State for the Colonies, and John Pownall, the Undersecretary of State for the American 
Department, in London and finding them “thunderstruck” by the news.52 Hutchinson said of 
the issues between Britain and her colonies following the actions of the First Continental 
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Congress that “so important an affair has not come before Parl [sic] since the [Glorious] 
Revolution” and commented that the “hostile Resolves of the Congress of Philadelphia had 
taken the English people by surprise.”53 In a November 1, 1774 diary entry, Hutchinson 
further described the arrival of the Suffolk Resolves as pushing him to a point where “It is 
out of my power any longer to promote a plan of conciliation.” He recounted Lord 
Dartmouth saying “if these Resolves of your people are to be depended on, they have 
declared War against us: they will not suffer any sort of Treaty.”54 Hutchinson further 
remarked that “all plans of that sort [reconciliation] are now at an end, or at least, 
suspended.”55 
Accounts of other British officials reflect similar sentiments. According to John 
Pownall’s notes of a Cabinet meeting on December 18, 1774, Attorney General Thurlow and 
Soliciter General Wedderburn characterized the Suffolk Resolves as “treasonous.”56 Lord 
Dartmouth commented on the Suffolk Resolves’ adoption, declaring that, in his view, this 
confirmed that the British government could not retreat. He condemned the signers as guilty 
of treason and called for their vigorous punishment.57 On November 19, 1774, in response to 
a series of letters and correspondence received from Governor Gage, King George III wrote 
 
 
53 Peter Orlando Hutchinson, ed., The Diary and Letters of His Excellency Thomas 
Hutchinson (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, and Company, 1884), 282, Adobe PDF eBook. 
 
54 Ibid., 284. 
 
55 Ibid., 286. 
 
56 Quoted in Neil L. York, “Imperial Impotence: Treason in 1774 Massachusetts,” 
Law and History Review 29, no. 3 (August 2011): 689. 
 
57 Ammerman, 130. 
57  
to Lord North describing the colonists as “ripe for mischief” and Gage’s recommendation of 
suspending Parliamentary acts as preposterous. He stated that Britain “must either master 
them or totally leave them to themselves and treat them as aliens.”58 
This commentary indicated that on both sides of the Atlantic, politicians and the 
general public at the very least knew that the Suffolk Resolves played a significant role in 
increasing tensions between Great Britain and the American colonies. They recognized the 
impact the adoption of the Resolves had on furthering the divide between the mother country 
and colonies. While Americans remained divided on the extent of the breach, British officials 
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The Suffolk Resolves and their endorsement by the First Continental Congress played 
a pivotal role in the formation of a unified resistance to British policy and served as a 
precursor to the American Revolution. Drafted in the aftermath of the punitive Coercive 
Acts, the Resolves reflected the growing discontent of American colonists who felt both 
limited and threatened by Parliamentary attempts to restore control and extract revenue from 
her distant colonies. The Suffolk Resolves furthered the divide between the mother country 
and colonies and forced issues into the open. 
The Resolves offered a well-reasoned, detailed program of resistance expressed in 
eloquent language. Their message of respectful, but determined, disagreement framed in 
Lockean language of natural rights and consensual contracts resonated with fellow colonists 
and served to crystallize opposition to British policy into a more unified voice. In this sense 
they served as a transitional catalyst for revolution by uniting the colonies in a way rarely 
seen before. 
By presenting their grievances to the First Continental Congress as a request for 
advice, the authors of the document galvanized that body into action, forcing them to take a 
stand on the immediate crisis in Boston and the deeper rift in Anglo-American relations. The 
First Continental Congress’ endorsement of the Resolves shifted the tone away from 
conservative requests for greater consideration to more forceful demands for protection from 
parliamentary misdeeds, greater control over internal affairs, and threats of armed action in 
defense of their rights. This gave more radical elements the momentum within the Congress 
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and diminished chances of compromise. The endorsement signaled a recognition of common 
grievances and united the various colonies in a common cause. 
Further, the Resolves served as the foundation for military resistance by offering an 
ultimatum in which militias would be used in a defensive manner to protect the rights and 
liberties of the colonists against Parliamentary overreach. The Congress’ endorsement 
emboldened Massachusetts in their resistance and laid the foundation for more militant 
activities. Conservative Americans and loyalists saw the Suffolk Resolves as instigating the 
violence at Lexington and Concord.1 As author Todd Andrlik argued, “by sanctioning the 
Resolves, Congress supported deeds as well as words. It vowed to stand behind a revolution 
that was in full swing throughout Massachusetts.”2 As T.H. Breen noted, for the colonists 
“this moment signaled the birth of a united movement to resist oppression,” which the North 
cabinet should ignore at its own peril.3 While some Americans remained optimistic that the 
relationship could be repaired, British officials saw the Resolves as a sign of open rebellion 
and determined that conciliation was no longer possible. This strengthened the resolve of the 
British cabinet, leading Lord Dartmouth to recognize that retreat was not an option.4 In 
British political circles, the lines had been drawn. 
In addition, the Suffolk Resolves helped to build the canon of future revolutionary 
texts through their eloquent and detailed account of respectful disagreement. Other county 
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conventions drew on the Resolves to formulate their own statement of grievances. Congress’ 
Declaration of Rights and Grievances contains milder, but nonetheless similar, sentiments. 
Moreover, interesting similarities exist between the Suffolk Resolves and the Declaration of 
Independence. The Declaration indirectly references previous statements of discontent by 
acknowledging that the British were made aware of the happiness of the colonists, but chose 
to continue down the path that would make the King a tyrant in the eyes of his American 
followers. 5 Many of the general grievances addressed in the Suffolk Resolves are echoed in 
the Declaration of Independence. The issues of taxation without representation, the 
establishment of standing armies and due process of law are all examples of shared concerns 
raised in both documents.6 The threat to take up arms in defense of colonial rights raised in 
the Suffolk Resolves comes to fruition in the formal Declaration of Independence and the 
Revolution that followed. 
5 Scott Douglas Gerber, The Declaration of Independence: Origins and Impact 
(Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2002), xv-xvii. 
6 Lincoln, ed., The Journals of Each Provincial Congress of Massachusetts, 601-605. 
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